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We sketch a model according to which tax havens attract corporate income generated in 
corrupted countries. In our framework, tax havens have two opposite effects on welfare. First, 
tax havens’ services have a positive effect on welfare through encouraging investment by 
firms fearing expropriation and bribes in corrupt countries. Second, by supporting corruption 
and the concealment of officials’ bribes, tax havens discourage the provision of public goods 
and hence have also a negative effect on welfare. The net welfare effect depends on the 
specified preferences and parameters. One source of this ambiguity is that the presence of 
multinational firms in corrupted countries is positively associated with demanding tax havens’ 
operations. Using firm-level data, we provide empirical support for this hypothesis. 
JEL-Code: F230, H250, H320. 
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The usual disclaimer applies. 1 Introduction
Tax havens have recently been heavily debated in the policy arena for several
reasons, ranging from fragile ￿scal positions of many economies to recent
revolutions against many corrupt autocratic o¢ cials who stored their assets
in havens. Academically, the role of tax havens in the world economy is
largely viewed within the framework of international tax competition. Most
studies assume that the real operation of the ￿rm takes place in a high-tax
country, possibly one with an advanced economy. The function of the a¢ liate
in the tax haven is to receive (a portion of) the corporate income, which is
thus shifted away from the domestic high-tax country for purposes of tax
avoidance.1
In this study, we focus on other roles of tax havens in the world economy.
First, we examine theoretically the connection between the operations of
￿rms in corrupt countries (possibly with low- and middle-income economies)
and ￿rms￿demand for tax havens￿services.2 Second, we model the corrupt
authority￿ s problem of choosing the optimal bribe rate. Third, we provide
new insights into welfare consequences of eliminating tax havens. Fourth, we
empirically analyse the link between operating in corrupt countries and the
presence of multinational ￿rms in tax havens, using German ￿rm-level data.
Firms operating in highly corrupt countries face special circumstances.
First, ￿rms bribe o¢ cials to maintain their investment activities. Second,
bribes do not insulate ￿rms from risks. In the absence of a credible rule of
law, contracts are not enforceable. Firms fear expropriation, blackmailing,
or a sudden eruption of instability in the corrupt host economy. Hence,
even if the corporate income tax rate in a corrupt country is relatively low,
multinational a¢ liates have a strong incentive to conceal and shift (a portion
of) their income. The question is then: Where to? The origin country is not
the most preferred option available for the multinational ￿rm, especially if
the parent ￿rm is located in a high-tax country. Alternatively, multinational
a¢ liates can transfer the income generated in highly corrupt countries to tax
1Dharmapala (2008) provides a survey.
2The negative relationship between corruption and GDP per capita is documented in
Svensson (2005), along with other variables related to corruption.
2havens.3
Public debates and media reports often assert that not only ￿rms but
also corrupt o¢ cials use tax havens for hiding income. Our theoretical sketch
explicitly considers the transfer of bribes to o⁄shore tax havens, and allows
the probability of revolt against the corrupt authority (eruption of instability)
to be a function of the provided amount of public goods. A higher bribe rate
increases the extracted rent by o¢ cials, but at the same time it reduces the
bribe base, since ￿rms￿demand for tax havens￿services increases with higher
bribes.
We analyse the welfare implications under various scenarios. The e⁄ects
of eliminating tax havens on the citizens of the corrupt country can be sum-
marised as follows:
￿ Firms￿investment in the corrupt country decreases under standard as-
sumptions on the interest elasticity of capital demand and on the cost of
shifting income from the corrupt country to the tax haven. Accordingly,
private consumption by the citizens of the corrupt country decreases.
Thus, the e⁄ect on welfare through ￿rms￿investment is negative.
￿ In a world without tax havens, it is more di¢ cult for corrupt o¢ cials
to conceal bribes. As a result, the provision of public goods unambigu-
ously increases in order to lower the probability of revolt and losing
o¢ ce. Hence, eliminating tax havens has a positive e⁄ect on welfare
by precluding their support for corruption.
The overall welfare e⁄ect depends on the functional forms and parameters
of the model. These new welfare results for a corrupt country complement
those in Slemrod and Wilson (2009), who consider only a non-corrupt coun-
try. In our framework, as in theirs, tax havens constitute a drain on revenues
of the non-corrupt country. In our setting, the welfare e⁄ect of eliminating
tax havens￿operations on the non-corrupt country is positive provided that
factor prices are constant.
Other, related studies point out that tax havens have positive e⁄ects on
welfare. These are summarised in three e⁄ects: (1) Tax havens support an
equilibrium where all non-havens set the same (high) tax rate and hence
raise revenues (Johannesen; 2010a), (2) borrowing from tax havens increases
3Firms in the corrupt country can be broadly interpreted to include not only foreign
a¢ liates but also domestic ￿rms.
3the e¢ ciency of the ￿rm and its investment at home (Hong and Smart;
2010), and (3) tax havens with advanced banking sectors (o⁄shore ￿nancial
centres) improve competition in the banking sectors in neighbouring coun-
tries, generating positive welfare e⁄ects (Rose and Spiegel; 2007). However,
these studies consider the issue from the standpoint of su¢ ciently advanced
economies, whereas our model stresses the importance of viewing the welfare
e⁄ects of tax havens from a global perspective by incorporating features of
less advanced economies. The notion that tax havens are linked to corruption
and development has been a concern in many discussions. The Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign A⁄airs published in 2009 a report focusing on tax havens
and development. In a chapter of this report, Torvik (2009) emphasises the
e⁄ects of tax havens on resource-rich countries and gives examples of dicta-
tors who shift money from dubious sources to tax havens. Related studies
are by Schjelderup (2011), who argues that tax havens reduce the costs of
entering illegal businesses, and Slemrod (2008), who underlines the status of
tax havens as a means of commercialisation of state sovereignty.4
Empirically, welfare and detailed information on tax evasion and corruption-
related matters are unobservable. However, we test the hypothesis stemmed
from our model positing that the presence of multinational ￿rms in corrupt
countries is positively associated with a high probability of demanding tax
havens￿operations. Based on conditional ￿xed-e⁄ects logistic regressions
and after controlling for ￿rm size and unobserved heterogeneity at the par-
ent ￿rm level, we ￿nd empirical support for this hypothesis. This new result
contributes to the existing empirical literature that links ￿rms￿demand for
tax havens￿a¢ liates to the tax regime of the home country or the size of the
￿rm (e.g., Desai et al., 2006, and Gumpert et al., 2011).5
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark model and
the resulting equilibrium equations determining the share of ￿rms that use
tax havens and the optimal bribe rate. In section 3, we provide a welfare
analysis of shutting down tax havens. Section 4 generalises the benchmark
setup by allowing the probability of revolt against the corrupt government to
be endogenous. Section 5 provides empirical results using the German MiDi
4The increasing academic interest in the tax havens￿businesses is re￿ ected in a num-
ber of recent contributions focusing on other, related aspects. Examples are Johannesen
(2010b), and Ma¢ ni (2009). Hebous (2011) provides a recent survey. Bardhan (1997)
surveys the literature on corruption and development.
5In a distinct but related study, Kesternich and Schnitzer (2010) show that multina-
tional a¢ liates have higher debt levels in environments of high expropriation risks.
4￿rm-level data. Section 6 concludes.
2 Benchmark Model
2.1 The Setup
We build on the model of Slemrod and Wilson (2009), and extend their setup
by including a corrupt country in addition to the non-corrupt country and the
tax haven. The timing of events is as follows. First, the non-corrupt country
chooses tax rates and tax enforcement, whereas corrupt governments choose
the bribe rates, the level of public goods, and the share of rents to shelter
in a tax haven. The decisions of the governments are simultaneous. In the
second stage, ￿rms are formed to ensure that the net expected interest rate
is the same in each country. In the third stage, taxes and bribes are paid, a
share of capital returns is sheltered, and public goods are provided. Finally,
in the last stage, expropriation either occurs or does not.
2.2 Firms in the Non-Corrupt Country
The problem of the ￿rms in the non-corrupt country is identical to that
in Slemrod and Wilson (2009).6 The technology depends on labour L and
capital K, and exhibits constant returns to scale. The before-tax return on
capital R is given by:
R = f(L=K) ￿ W(L=K) ￿ (L=K);
where W(:) denotes the wage as a function of the labour-capital ratio. The
non-corrupt country sets a tax rate t on capital. Firms buy services c from
the tax haven to conceal a share sn of capital income.7 The share sn is a
concave function of c. The tax haven sets a price p per unit of provided
6There are three reasons for including the non-corrupt country. First, it enables a direct
comparison with the implications of the model of Slemrod and Wilson (2009). Second, it
makes it clear that the implications of the model are not driven by the assumption that
there isn￿ t a non-corrupt country. Third, it makes the mapping from the theory to our
empirical analysis more intuitive.
7In this study, we abstain from modelling the choice of a country to become a tax haven,
since this is considered in several studies such as Kanbur and Keen (1993), Dharmapala
and Hines (2009), and Slemrod and Wilson (2009). The standard result is that small
jurisdictions ￿nd it more attractive to become tax havens.
5services c. Hence, the variable cost of buying these services is pc.Firms di⁄er
in the ￿xed costs of using tax havens as captured by the parameter ￿, which is
the rrealisation of a random variable with a continuous distribution function
G(￿). The reported share of income, (1 ￿ sn), is subject to the tax rate t.
After-tax pro￿ts with the advantage of income-shifting are:
rn = R[sn ￿ (pc + ￿) + (1 ￿ t)(1 ￿ sn)]: (1)




The following equality determines the share of ￿rms that will use the tax
shelter:
￿ = tsn ￿ pc:
2.3 Firms in the Corrupt Country
Without loss of generality, we assume that the tax rate in the corrupt country
is zero. Further, ￿rms operating in the corrupt country face a probability of
expropriation ￿. The corrupt country sets a bribe per euro of capital earnings,
b. The ￿rm aims to circumvent reporting a portion of its pro￿ts in the corrupt
country to avoid paying higher bribes. When the ￿rm shifts pro￿ts from the
corrupt country to the non-corrupt country, whether by standard methods
of pro￿t shifting such as transfer pricing or by tax evasion, pro￿ts will be
subject to the high tax rate of the non-corrupt country. Although bribes
enter our model exactly in the same way as taxes in the non-corrupt country
do, there is an essential di⁄erence between the two. The latter instrument
is the product of the rule of law, whereas the former is at the discretion of
government o¢ cials. As with any product of discretion, there is no guarantee
that paying bribes prevents future extortion.8 After-tax pro￿ts are then
rc = R[sc ￿ (pc + ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ b)(1 ￿ sc)]: (2)
8The probability of expropriation in the tax haven is assumed to be zero. This is
consistent with the evidence in Dharmapala and Hines (2009). Tax havens are typically
highly stable entities with sound governance. For an overview of issues of tax evasion,
weak auditing, and enforceability of tax rules in developing economies, see Fuest and
Riedel (2010).
6Consequently, the FOC is
s
0
c (b + ￿ ￿ b￿) = p: (3)
Comparing this with the expression for the non-corrupt country ts0 = p, for
b = t, we note that s0 is smaller in the corrupt country than in the non-
corrupt country. Further, because of convex costs, s must be larger in the
corrupt country. Thus, the number of ￿rms that use tax havens is also larger
in the corrupt country:
￿ = ~ bsc ￿ pc;
where ~ b is de￿ned as: ~ b := b+￿ ￿b￿: This can be interpreted as the e⁄ective
expected bribe rate that re￿ ects both the necessity to bribe and potential
extortion. To summarise, we can state that:
￿ Given identical tax rates in the non-corrupt and the corrupt country, a
￿rm uses tax havens more extensively if it operates in a corrupt country:
sc > sn. This is in line with Shleifer and Vishny (1993), who state that
corruption is more distortionary and costly than taxation.
￿ The proportion of income shifted to tax havens increases with an in-
crease in bribes b and the probability of expropriation ￿.
2.4 Equilibrium
The corrupt government maximises its rents (bribes net of public goods)
subject to an obligation to provide at least a minimal level of public goods
(g ￿ g0). The corrupt government faces a probability of revolt by its own
citizens and hence losing o¢ ce (￿): The government may choose to conceal
(a portion of) bribes from its own citizens by channeling them to the tax
haven at a cost of ￿g. For the moment, we assume that ￿ is exogenous. We
will relax this assumption in the next section, and explicitly permit ￿ to
be a decreasing function of public goods g. The households￿budget is the
same as in the non-corrupt country (x = rck￿+W(R)), where k￿ is the ￿xed
stock of capital owned by the inhabitants of the corrupt country. Taking the
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￿
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s: t : g ￿ g0
x = rck
￿ + W(R);
and constraint (4). The government will use tax havens to shift its entire
revenues if
￿~ b(1 ￿ ￿sc) > ￿g: (6)
Otherwise, the government will not demand havens￿services at all. If ￿ is
exogenous, then the ￿rst constraint is binding: g = g0. In this case, the
problem becomes one-dimensional with the necessary optimality condition
for an interior solution:9 ￿
1 ￿ ￿sc ￿ sc~ b
d￿











~ b(1 ￿ ￿sc) ￿ ￿g
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we derive the following expression:
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Intuitively, the corrupt government bene￿ts directly from a higher bribe
rate and a higher interest rate, but at the same time it loses the bribe base.
The loss of bribe base consists of three parts: (1) the number of ￿rms using
havens￿services, ￿s~ b
d￿
d~ b, (2) the amount of service used by each ￿rm, ￿￿~ bds
d~ b,
and (3) a potential loss of investment due to a higher interest rate, Rk0(R).
We ￿rst consider the corrupt country as having a small open economy
that does not a⁄ect the net interest rate.
9The second-order condition is presented in the appendix.
83 Welfare E⁄ects of Eliminating Tax Havens￿
Services
We analyse two particular cases: First, there is no tax haven. (Technically,
tax havens￿services are prohibitively costly.) Second, tax havens are perva-
sive; that is, capital can be shifted to the tax haven with zero ￿xed cost.
3.1 Eliminating Tax Havens
We can model the no-havens situation by shifting the distribution of ￿ up to




= 1 ￿~ b: (8)
Since government also cannot use havens￿services, using the same optimality
condition (7) with explicit derivative dR
d~ b = R





Note that if " ￿ 1, the government will want to charge the full bribe.
Therefore, " has to be larger than 1 (" > 1). The intuition behind this condi-
tion is similar to the textbook result in the case of a monopolist that operates
only on the elastic segment of the demand function. This requirement is sat-
is￿ed, for example, in the case of a Cobb￿ Douglas function: f = k￿ where ￿
is a constant.
3.2 Pervasive Tax Havens




= 1 ￿~ b(1 ￿ sc) ￿ pc; (9)
whereby ~ bs > pc.
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; (10)
9and thus it depends on the properties of the function of the cost of avoidance
and on the elasticity of capital demand.10
3.3 Comparison







and let ￿ denote the elasticity of the share of reported income with respect












Both ￿ and ￿ are evaluated at ~ b = 1=": We show in the appendix that bribes
are higher in the presence of the tax haven if
￿ + ￿ < 1: (11)
We can distinguish between three cases:
Case 1 (￿ + ￿)j~ b=1="> 1
The bribe rate decreases in response to the availability of tax havens.
Since dR
d~ b > 0 for any bribe rate, the investment increases further. Therefore,
the investment in the new equilibrium with tax havens will be higher than
without tax havens. If the reported income is very sensitive to a change in
the bribe rate, introducing the tax haven increases investment and decreases
the bribe rate.
Case 2 (￿ + ￿)j~ b=1=" < 1 and ~ bh < b0
The bribe rate increases. This exerts downward pressure on investment.
Moreover, it raises the elasticity ￿ + ￿, as otherwise no interior solution
is possible. The new equilibrium is then characterised by ~ bh such that
(￿ + ￿)j~ b=bh = 1. Let b0 be the bribe rate that results in no-havens invest-
ment level: R(b0) = "
"￿1r. The investment level in the new equilibrium is
10The derivation is documented in the appendix. Note that alternatively, we can consider
the case when p = 0, ￿ > 0. In this case, those ￿rms with ￿ ￿ ~ b shift all their income to
the tax haven whereas the rest of the ￿rms do not use the tax haven at all. The results
are similar to the case where ￿ ￿ 0, and are available upon request.
10Table 1: The Bribe Rate and Investment after Introducing the Tax Haven
(￿ + ￿)j~ b=1="> 1
(￿ + ￿)j~ b=1="< 1;
~ bh< b0
(￿ + ￿)j~ b=1="< 1;
~ bh> b0
Bribe rate # " "
Investment " " #
higher than without havens if ~ bh < b0. When the reported income is not very
sensitive to the bribe rate, but if it responds then it will respond su¢ ciently
fast, then both the bribe rate and investment rise.
Case 3 (￿ + ￿)j~ b=1=" < 1 and ~ bh > b0
If the reported income is neither very sensitive to the bribe rate, nor fast
in changing, then the bribe rate will rise and investment will fall. The bribe
rate increases with an introduction of cheap havens￿services. This may not
seem intuitive at the ￿rst sight; why it should be more pro￿table to charge
higher bribes when it is easier for the ￿rms to escape these bribes? The
reason is that the corrupt government as a ￿rst mover fully internalises the
potential bene￿t. However, this requires a special form of avoidance cost
function with a very high degree of convexity of the costs of avoidance such
that the bribe elasticity decreases with the amount of shifted income. This
in turn allows higher monopoly prices ￿higher bribes. We view this scenario
as a merely theoretical possibility, though, and we rule it out in the rest of
the paper.
To sum up, table 1 presents the results of these three cases. Finally, note
that if ￿ + ￿ = 1, then bribes and investment remain unchanged if we shut
down the tax haven.
We summarise this discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Investment in the corrupt country is higher when all ￿rms
demand tax havens services as compared to the case when no ￿rm demands
tax havens￿services.
Proof. The proof of proposition 1 directly follows from the above discussion.
Since investment is mechanically related to the gross interest rate and
hence also to the wage, the following corollary is immediate:
11Corollary 1 Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, the gross interest rate
R (wage W) in the corrupt country is lower (higher) in the case of pervasive
havens than in the case of no tax havens.
Intuitively, the rents of the corrupt government should decrease in the
presence of a tax haven because avoidance opportunities for ￿rms put an
additional constraint on the bribes that the government would like to impose.
Proposition 2 In the absence of the threat of revolt, the corrupt government
is at least not worse o⁄ in a situation without a tax haven than in the situation
with a haven.
Proof. See appendix.
There is a caveat in our formulation that may revert the result of Propo-
sition 2. The corrupt government also wants to use tax havens, if ￿ > 0.
Clearly, for large values of the revolt probability, the gain from not letting
the ￿rms avoid bribes is dwarfed by the danger of losing all the bribe revenue
as a result of people￿ s upheaval.
Corollary 2 There exists ￿￿ > 0 such that the corrupt government prefers
no havens for any ￿ < ￿￿ and pervasive havens for any ￿ > ￿￿.
4 Extended Model
4.1 Endogenous Probability of Revolution
Thus far, we have assumed that probability of revolt ￿ is exogenously given.
However, it is likely that it is a⁄ected by the amount of provided public
good.11 In the following we assume that ￿ (g) is a decreasing convex function
with limg!1 ￿ (g) = 0. We assume that g0 is low enough not to be binding
when havens are not available. Then the part of optimal solution for the
problem (5) will be
￿(1 ￿ sg)~ b(1 ￿ ￿sc)Rk￿
0 (g
￿) = 1: (12)
11For example, the popular uprisings during the Arab Spring triggered a number of
reports on dictators￿ secret deposits in tax havens (e.g., Schweizer Fernsehen; 2011).
Protesters were demanding reforms (more public goods in our model) or the stepping
down of rulers.
12The use of tax havens is now pro￿table as long as ￿ (g￿)~ b(1 ￿ ￿sc) ￿ ￿g,
so there will generally be an interior s￿
g such that the pair g￿;s￿
g solves the
equation above together with
￿ (g
￿)~ b(1 ￿ ￿sc) = ￿g: (13)
Clearly, this interior solution is only possible, if ~ b(1 ￿ ￿sc) > ￿g. Otherwise,
no tax haven is used by the government.
4.1.1 The E⁄ect of Tax Havens￿Services
For prohibitively high ￿, (13) can no longer hold, but (12) determines g￿:
￿~ bRk￿
0 (g
￿) = 1; (14)
where bribe is determined by (9), i.e., independently of g. Thus, the proba-
bility of revolt can be determined from the inverse of the government revenue
1=~ bRk; the higher the government revenue, the higher the provision of public
good.
In the opposite case, when buying concealment services is costless, the
government will not provide any public good, and hence the public good
constraint is binding. Notice that Proposition 1 still holds in our extended
model, because its proof does not rely on any properties of ￿. To sum up,
we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 It is always more attractive to eliminate tax havens if ￿ is
endogenous.
Proof. See appendix.
Intuitively, the endogenous probability of losing the o¢ ce adds another
channel through which tax havens negatively a⁄ect the welfare in the corrupt
countries. Namely, havens decrease the provision of public good in corrupt
countries.
4.2 The E⁄ects on the Corrupt and Non-Corrupt Coun-
tries
The above analysis has focused on the corrupt country. In this subsection,
we consider the above-mentioned scenarios with a full setting. The tax haven
13fully shuts down and is prevented from providing services in either the cor-
rupt or the non-corrupt country. In this extended setup, there is a potential
asymmetry in the capital stock of both the non-corrupt and the corrupt coun-
try. Despite the fact that the net interest rates are equalised, the gross rates
do not have to be equal, because of the di⁄erent government objective func-
tions. The market-clearing condition is k (R) + k (Rc) = k￿.This condition
pins down the net interest rate in the world.
We summarise the results in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 The elimination of tax havens increases welfare in the non-
corrupt country and decreases it in the corrupted country, if factor prices are
una⁄ected.
Proof. See appendix.
Naturally, this result may be weakened or overturned if the endogenous
revolt probability is taken into account. As we can see, Propositions 1 and
4 isolate di⁄erent channels through which tax havens may a⁄ect welfare in
the corrupt countries. Proposition 1 describes a change in welfare due to
the change in investment and hence wage income of the people. Proposition
4 studies the change in the world return on capital and through it on the
welfare of the people who own this capital. Our ￿nding is that the presence
of tax havens a⁄ects welfare in the same direction through both channels.
If the factor prices do change, the welfare e⁄ect in the corrupt country
may arise from the change in investment and the net capital return. As for
the non-corrupt country, it may bene￿t from an increase in R in the corrupt
country only by attracting additional capital so that the results of Slemrod
and Wilson hold. Correspondingly, a decrease in R in the corrupt coun-
try may act against the welfare gains of the non-corrupt country following
eliminating tax havens.
4.3 Example
To provide a deeper insight, we present in this subsection an example em-
ploying speci￿c functional forms and parameter values. The production is
characterised by a Cobb￿ Douglas function: f = k￿. This yields R = ￿k￿￿1:
Consequently, we obtain expressions for k, ;k0 (R); and ". Further, we cali-
brate the parameter ￿ = 1
3 ￿a standard value in the literature. We assume
that ￿ (g) = 1
1+Ag where A > 0, and we solve for the optimal g. We calibrate
14Table 2: Numerical Example




2 0:05 0:01 2:7 0:95
The tax haven provides services to the non-corrupt but not to the corrupt country
Variable s ~ bh ~ bnh Rh Rnh kh knh gnh
Value 0 0:05 2
3
0:013
0:95 0:03 178:2 37:037 0:15
Tax havens￿services are fully eliminated
Variable s ~ bh ~ bnh Rh Rnh kh knh gnh rh
Value 0 0:05 2
3
0:017826
0:95 0:03 74:873 37:037 0:153 0:017
A by assuming that the real net interest rate is 1%. This gives A = 2:7.
Note that B := 1 ￿ t(1 ￿ sn) ￿ pc = 0:95 to ensure equal gross interest rate
across countries.






.12 The parameter a > 0. Higher values of a correspond to
high costs of avoidance. A summary of the numerical example is presented
in table 2.
Consider a tax haven that provides services to the non-corrupt country
but not to the corrupt country. The tax haven serves as a threatening mech-
anism that forces the corrupt government to keep the bribe rate rather low.
This in turn lowers the gross interest rate and enhances investment. In the
lowest panel in table 2, we consider completely shutting down the tax haven.
As a result, the net interest rate can be altered. In the absence of the tax































The results show that the positive e⁄ect of the tax haven on investment
is weakened by the general-equilibrium e⁄ect. The out￿ ow of capital is not
12This functional form is suggested by Reinganum and Wilde (1986).
15as large as in the case of ￿xed net and gross interest rates in the non-corrupt
country. The welfare channel through the provision of public good, however,
does not change. In the next subsection, we summarise our results and
position our contribution in the literature.
4.4 A Summary of Our Welfare Analysis
Is the elimination of tax havens welfare enhancing? Our contribution for
answering the above question can be summarised as follows:
￿ For a ￿xed bribe rate, tax havens can have positive e⁄ects on welfare
by facilitating investment by ￿rms fearing bribes and expropriation
in corrupt countries. However, this e⁄ect is weakened by the corrupt
government reducing the bribe rate.13 The net e⁄ect depends on the
exact functional form of the cost of using tax havens and on the interest
elasticity of capital demand.
￿ Welfare e⁄ects of tax havens go beyond ￿rms￿operations. Tax havens
have negative e⁄ects on welfare by facilitating deporting and the con-
cealment of o¢ cials￿bribes.
￿ The ￿nal e⁄ects on welfare are illustrated in ￿gure 1. Under standard
preferences, the welfare function is concave in investment and public
goods. Even if we assume that investment will always decrease as a
result of shutting down tax havens, the net impact on welfare can be
positive. Starting from an initial point (a), eliminating tax havens￿ser-
vices will cause either a movement along the welfare curve to the south
of (a) or a shift to another welfare curve within the shaded rectangle.
The ￿nal e⁄ect will be positive if the new welfare curve is located some-
where within the shaded region determined by the initial welfare curve
and the horizontal line through point (a).
13This would be consistent with some empirical studies such as that of Fisman and
Svensson (2007), who ￿nd that high bribe rates negatively a⁄ect the growth of ￿rms in
Uganda.






We use the German MiDi ￿rm-level data on outbound foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI). This data set is exceptionally suited for our analysis. In
contrast to several other ￿rm-level data, the MiDi data include the ￿popu-
lation" of German ￿rms investing abroad. The German foreign trade and
payments regulation obliges all ￿rms investing abroad, and satisfying the
reporting requirements, to report key information on their a¢ liates abroad.
Consequently, we are not greatly concerned about sample selection bias or
non-random sampling. The data contain detailed information on the owner-
ship chain. That is, we can observe if the parent ￿rm indirectly, via another
￿rm, owns an a¢ liate in a tax haven. The data span from 1996 to 2008 and
contain about 23,000 observations a year at the a¢ liate level (about 7000
parent ￿rms a year).
175.2 Econometric Speci￿cation
Empirically, welfare and detailed information on tax evasion and corruption-
related matters are unobservable. However, our data contain parent ￿rms
located in Germany investing via a¢ liates around the world. To map from
our theory to the empirics, we note that the maximisation problem of the par-
ent ￿rm is equivalent to maximising pro￿ts separately in the non-corrupted
country and in the corrupted country. Our idea is to test the crucial hypoth-
esis directly implied by our theoretical sketch.
Hypothesis 1: The number of ￿rms using tax havens increases with an
increase in bribes b and the expropriation probability ￿.
An increase in bribes and/or the probability of expropriations is in essence
an increase in a measure of corruption. For the empirical analysis, Hypothesis
1 can be reformulated as:
Hypothesis 1￿: The presence of a ￿rm in a highly corrupt country, as
captured by a corruption measure, has a positive e⁄ect on the probability of
having an a¢ liate in a tax haven.
To test Hypothesis 1￿ , we have to transform the country-speci￿c variables
associated with a¢ liated ￿rms to parent-￿rm-speci￿c variables. Figure 2
illustrates the structure of the data in connection with our application. for
this purpose, we exploit the information on the ownership structure and the
foreign investment of the parent ￿rm.
We employ a discrete choice setup:
yk;t = ￿0 + ￿1hck;t + ￿2high_taxfirmk;t + ￿Xk;t +  k + ￿t + "k;t (15)
The dependent variable is de￿ned as follows:
￿ yk;t =
￿
1 if parent ￿rm k has an a¢ liate in a tax haven in year t
0 otherwise
Table 3 displays a list of tax havens in our data set. The corresponding
variable is denoted by y1. As emphasised in Hines (2010), di⁄erent lists based
on di⁄erent criteria share to a very a large extent identical countries. Since
Austria might be particularly important for German ￿rms, for robustness we
also de￿ne y2 after excluding Austria from the list of havens.
The variable of interest is
￿ hck;t =
￿
1 if parent ￿rm k operates in a highly corrupt country in year t
0 otherwise
18Figure 2: A Demonstration of a Simple Structure of a Multinational Firm in
the Data
A country is considered to be highly corrupt if the value of its corruption
index lies in the lowest quartile of the World Bank Control of Corruption
index.14 Table 4 displays the countries that satisfy this criterion. We denote
the variable based on this list by hc1. For robustness, we also de￿ne another
variable, hc2, based on the Freedom from Corruption index of the Heritage
Institute.
We employ pooled and also conditional ￿xed-e⁄ects logistic regressions
allowing for unobserved heterogeneity at the parent level as captured by  k.
Additionally, we include year-￿xed e⁄ects ￿t. We rely on maximum likeli-
hood estimations. Since hck;t is de￿ned as an alternative-speci￿c variable,
the sign of the estimated coe¢ cient ￿1 re￿ ects the sign of the e⁄ect of hck;t
on yk;t. Our interest is in the qualitative e⁄ects rather than the magnitudes
of the elasticities.
We control for tax planning activities related to multinational a¢ liates




1 if parent ￿rm k operates in a high-tax country in year t
0 otherwise
14A high value of this index indicates a low level of corruption. See Kaufmann, Kraay,
and Mastruzzi (2010) for details on the methodology and construction of the Control of
Corruption index.
19Table 3: A List of Tax Havens in Our Sample
Europe Middle East and Africa America Asia
Austria Bahrain Bahamas Macau
Cyprus Israel Barbados Malaysia
Gibraltar Kuwait Bermuda Singapore
Guernsey Liberia British Virgin Islands Thailand
Isle of Man Marocco Cayman Islands
Jersey Mauritius Costa Rica
Liechtenstein Oman Netherlands Antilles
Luxembourg Panama
Malta St. Kitts and Nevis
Switzerland Uruguay
A country is considered to be a high-tax country if its statutory corporate
income tax rate lies in the highest quartile of tax rates in the sample. De
facto, Germany exempts foreign income from taxation. Hence, it is partic-
ularly attractive to establish an a¢ liate in a tax haven if the parent ￿rm
operates in high-tax country.15 As further control variables in X, follow-
ing Desai et al. (2006), we include the size and the square of the size of
the ￿rm as captured by the sum of all revenues from its operations abroad
(excluding revenues from a¢ liates located in tax havens). Some theoretical
studies suggest that larger ￿rms are more likely to demand tax havens￿ser-
vices (Krautheim and Schmidt-Eisenlohr; 2011). Table 5 lists the variables
used in the regression analysis.
15See Gumpert et al. (2011).
20Table 4: Countries with High Levels of Corruption in Our Sample (World
Bank Index)
Europe and CIS Middle East and Africa America Asia
Albania Algeria Bolivia Bangladesh
Azerbaijan Angola Columbia Indonesia
Belarus Cameroon Dominican Republic Iran
Bulgaria Congo Ecuador Pakistan
Georgia C￿te d￿ Ivoire El Salvador Philippines



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Conditional logit estimates rely on time-varying parent-￿rm-speci￿c vari-
ables. However, some ￿rms do not operate at all in tax havens, while others
do operate in tax havens during the entire sample period. Consequently, in
order to exploit cross-sectional variation, we present in the ￿rst four columns
of table 6 estimation results from a pooled logit with industry and year ￿xed
e⁄ects. Robust standard errors are reported between brackets. The e⁄ect of
hc1 on the probability of having an a¢ liate located in a tax haven is positive
and signi￿cant at the 1 percent con￿dence level in all speci￿cations with and
without industry ￿xed e⁄ects. This result supports Hypothesis 1. Column
(3) includes also control variables. Firms that operate in high-tax countries
are more likely to operate also in tax havens. This is consistent with the
notion that multinational ￿rms use tax haven operations for tax planning
purposes, especially under exemption regimes (Gumpert et al., 2011).
Further, we allow for a possible correlation between the size of the ￿rm
and its presence in a corrupt country. The estimated coe¢ cient of the size
of the parent ￿rm, as captured by the log of its total sales around the world
excluding revenues from its tax havens, is positive. We include also the
square of the size of the ￿rm. It enters with a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect.
Since the model is not linear, the qualitative interaction e⁄ect of the size
of the ￿rm cannot be read directly from those estimates. Elasticities have
to be computed for this variable. However, when we include only the size
variable without its square, the e⁄ect is positive, suggesting that the larger
the ￿rm, the larger the probability of demanding tax havens￿services (results
are not reported). More importantly, the signi￿cance and the sign of the
coe¢ cient of hc1 are maintained. Additionally, in column (4), we re-estimate
the model but exclude ￿nancial services ￿rms from the sample. The results
are maintained.
To allow for unobserved heterogeneity at the ￿rm level, we present in
columns (5) to (8) conditional logit estimates with parent ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects.
This strategy also allows for industry-speci￿c variables, since these are nested
in the ￿rm-speci￿c e⁄ects. Standard errors are clustered at the parent ￿rm
level, allowing the error terms to be correlated within a group. The positive
and highly signi￿cant estimated coe¢ cient of hc1 of 1.263 in column (1) also
supports Hypothesis 1.
In addition, we include a measure of diversi￿cation of parent ￿rm activi-
ties. It also, to some extent, re￿ ects the size of the ￿rm. The results suggest
23that it is positively associated with the probability of having an a¢ liate in
a tax haven. Furthermore, the estimates indicate that operating in high-tax
countries and diversi￿cation of the ￿rm increase the probability of demand-
ing tax havens￿services. We obtain similar results in column (8) after we
discard ￿nancial ￿rms.
For further robustness checks, table 7 provides additional results partic-
ularly regarding three aspects: (1) The choice of the list of tax havens. For
this purpose, we use a new dependent variable y2 based on a list of havens
excluding Austria and Luxembourg to ensure that the results are not driven
by two bordering countries. (2) The choice of the list of corrupt countries.
For this purpose, we use the Heritage Institute Freedom from Corruption
index, instead of the World Bank Control of Corruption index, to identify
highly corrupt countries. The corresponding variable is denoted by hc2. (3)
The inclusion of a continuous corruption measure rather than a discrete one.
We de￿ne "size inv corru" as the logarithm of (1+) the size of ￿rms￿oper-
ations in corrupt countries. Our results are maintained in all speci￿cations.
For instance, in columns (5), (7), and (8), our variable of interest size inv
corru is positive and signi￿cant together with the other two size variables
and the diversi￿cation variable. This is reassuring that our results are not
driven by a mechanical correlation between the size of the ￿rm and oper-
ating in corrupted countries. Thus, over all, after controlling for operation
in high-tax countries, size, and the diversity of the ￿rm, the estimates are
consistent with Hypothesis 1.
Finally, we end this section by stressing the caveat that our theoretical
reasoning in the previous sections is not a model of ￿rms￿entry into foreign
economies. Empirically, for the purposes of our study, we are essentially in-
terested in establishing a rigorous correlation between operating in corrupt
countries and in tax havens after controlling for size and other parent-￿rm
characteristics. While our conditional logistic regression results suggest a
causal relationship, sceptical readers may raise concerns about potential en-
dogeneity in that ￿rms invest in corrupt countries because they already have
a¢ liates in tax havens, and not the other way around. Arguably, however,
the cost of establishing a tax haven a¢ liate can be very low, supporting our
presentation. For example, Sharman (2010) reports that one can open a bank













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Multinational ￿rms can rely, in the words of Slemrod (2010), on ￿a mere
stroke of the pen" to design and implement their tax and other related strate-
gies. We have developed a theoretical model that links ￿rms￿investment in
corrupt countries and their demand for tax havens￿services in order to es-
cape higher bribes and expropriation. The model o⁄ers an explanation for
the need of ￿rms for tax havens￿services even if the statutory tax rate is
low. Furthermore, our model has indicated new welfare e⁄ects of eliminating
tax havens. Tax havens may support investment in corrupt countries, but
at the same time they provide a secure shelter for corrupt o¢ cials￿earnings.
Based on ￿rm-level data on outbound FDI, we have found empirical support
for one hypothesis implied by our model: ￿rms￿investment in highly cor-
rupt countries is associated with a high probability of having a¢ liates in tax
havens.
One policy implication of our study is that eliminating tax havens￿op-
erations must be considered from a global perspective. Tax havens in our
model could ￿ ourish even if they were to stop providing services to ￿rms
in highly advanced ("non-corrupt") economies. A treaty or an arrangement
that does not consider also developing and resource-rich countries may not
be e⁄ective. Our theoretical model is static. A dynamic approach may re-
veal further welfare e⁄ects of shutting down tax havens by modelling the
transition from a corrupt country to a non-corrupt country. While a tax
haven can support investment (and corruption) in corrupt countries in view
of their weak institutional setup, eradicating corruption can substantially en-
hance foreign direct investment. Such a framework can be a fruitful topic for
future research.
277 Appendix
7.1 Second Order Condition
To simplify notations, in what follows, we skip the subscripts attached to s.
￿






d~ b ￿ s~ b
d2￿



































d~ b2 d~ b < 0;
A necessary condition for interior equilibrium is
￿












For zero-￿xed costs, this expression simpli￿es to:
￿




(s ￿ pc) + (1 ￿ ")(1 ￿ s)
2 < 0:
7.2 Optimal Bribes with Pervasive Havens
From the optimality condition (7) with ￿ = ￿g = 0 and ￿ = 1;
d￿
d~ b = 0. We
write: ￿








We implicitly di⁄erentiate (9) and apply the envelope theorem to obtain:
￿
1 ￿~ b(1 ￿ s) ￿ pc
￿ dR
d~ b
= (1 ￿ s)R:
Since pro￿ts of the ￿rms cannot go up as a result of an increase in bribes,
the right-hand side of the above expression is positive. Since the left-hand
side is positive as well, it must be that dR
d~ b > 0.
28Plugging this into (18a), we get:
￿




R + (1 ￿ ")~ b(1 ￿ s)
2 R
￿
1 ￿~ b(1 ￿ s) ￿ pc
￿￿1
= 0: (19a)
However, from the ￿rst order condition of the ￿rms:
s
0~ b = p;
and
s
0d~ b + s


















d~ b = ￿ s02
s00~ b into (19a):
￿




R + (1 ￿ ")~ b(1 ￿ s)
2 R
￿
1 ￿~ b(1 ￿ s) ￿ pc
￿￿1
= 0;
where 1 ￿ s + s02
s00 > 0 (correspondingly, (1 ￿ s)s00 + s02 < 0). Otherwise,
the equality does not hold because dR
d~ b > 0 and " > 1. Simplifying with the
use of FOC s0~ b = p, we get the expression (10).
7.3 Deriving Condition (11)
Start from a situation without a tax haven. The optimal bribe rate is just
the inverse of capital demand elasticity, ~ b = 1
". Next, introduce a tax haven.











R. Naturally, the investment will
then increase, driving the interest rate down to match the world net interest
rate r. Faced with this higher capital, the government will want to raise
the bribe rate, if d
h
~ b(1 ￿ s)Rk
i
=d~ bj~ b=1=" > 0; that is, the government rev-
enue increases. The total e⁄ect of the bribe can be decompose into 3 e⁄ects:
(1) The direct positive e⁄ect (1 ￿ s)Rk, (2) the negative e⁄ect of induc-
ing avoidance ￿~ bRk ds
d~ b, and (3) a negative e⁄ect of decreasing investment
~ b(1 ￿ s)
d(Rk)
d~ b (because dR
d~ b > 0 and
d(Rk)
dR = k (1 ￿ ") < 0).
29The condition for an increase in the bribe rate is
(1 ￿ s)Rk > ~ bRk
ds
db




all evaluated at ~ b = 1=". Plug ￿ and ￿ into the previous expression to obtain
the condition for an increase in the bribe rate in the presence of the tax
haven:
￿ + ￿ < 1:
7.4 Proof of Proposition 2
With ￿ = ￿g = 0, consider a change in bribe rate that preserves the gross in-
terest rate and hence investment. From (8) and (9) we get ~ bnh = ~ bh (1 ￿ sc)+
pc. The havens allocation is feasible, when no haven is available. Then the
statement of the proposition follows by revealed preference argument with
the government being strictly better o⁄ whenever ~ bsc > pc.
7.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Since g0 is assumed to be su¢ ciently small (in fact, it can be normalised to
zero), we have g￿ > g0. At the same time, R and k are the same regardless
of whether ￿ is exogenous or not. Since the utility u(x;g) is increasing in
g, the utility is higher with endogenous probability if there were no havens;
in the case with pervasive havens, it is the same, whether the probability is
exogenous or endogenous.
7.6 Proof of Proposition 4
The result for the non-corrupt country is proven in Slemrod and Wilson
(2009). Regarding the corrupt country, introducing the tax haven puts
downward pressure on R. In order to keep R unchanged, r has to increase
as described in Proposition 1. Then we have rnh < rh ) xnh < xh and
u(xnh;g0) < u(xh;g0).
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